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AbstrAct: there is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of 
Hegel’s social and political theories, the flavour of old-style ‘apology’ for his liberal credentials, as 
though there exists a real need to prove he holds basic liberal views palatable to the hegemonic, 
contemporary political worldview. such an approach is no doubt motivated by the need to 
reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when Hegel has finished discussing the 
flaws and contradictions of the Kantian model of moral judgement. the main claim made in 
the following pages is that the critique of ‘subjective’ moralities is neither the sole nor even the 
main reason for the adoption of an immanent doctrine of ethics. this paper will look to Hegel’s 
mature theory of action as motivating the critique of transcendentalism rather than merely filling 
in the hole left when one rejects Kant and it will discuss what the consequences of this approach 
are for the role of the moral conscience within the political sphere, arguing that Hegel’s own 
conditions of free action would not be met unless the subjective moral conscience was operative 
in the rational state.
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1 introduction
there is at present, amongst Hegel scholars and in the interpretative discussions of 
Hegel’s social and political theories, the flavour of old-style ‘apology’ for his liberal cre-
dentials, as though—prior to any attempt to engage with the social ethics he proposes—
there exists a real need to prove Hegel holds basic liberal views palatable to the hege-
monic, contemporary political worldview.1 and this almost ubiquitous defensive attitude 
is present even in the face of a marked absence of convincing, contemporary avowals 
of the opposite, as though the default starting position is to assume that Hegel is a con-
     1. the most obvious example of this ‘apology’ style of writing is to be found in Westphal’s attempt to prove 
beyond doubt that Hegel is a ‘reform-minded liberal’ (p. 234), see Kenneth Westphal, ‘the basic context 
and structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right’, in f. beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, cambridge, 
cambridge university press, 1993. there is putative assumption that conservatism is bad, an attitude which 
is perhaps mistaken, but i do not have space to elaborate on this here. it is admittedly a ‘contested’ con-
cept.
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servative or reactionary who distrusts the capacity of the modern subjective conscience 
to interrogate and legitimate social laws, conventions and institutions (that is, right in 
its broadest sense).2 the putative motivation for such an understated presentation of 
Hegel’s endorsement of subjective conscience within the limits and requirements of a ra-
tional state is perhaps due to two factors: one, the historical, yet false, understanding of 
Hegel as a conservative3; and two, one of the methods for understanding Hegel’s ethics 
is to reconstruct what is left of the modern moral conscience when the philosopher has 
finished discussing the flaws and contradictions of the Kantian model of moral judge-
ment and motivation.4 although this is a fruitful and largely correct approach, it ignores 
the fact that Hegel’s theory of action motivates the critique of transcendentalism rather 
than merely fills in the hole when one rejects Kantian ethics.5 
to state clearly and unequivocally what the major claim of this article is, i hold 
that the critique of ‘subjective’ moralities in general and the critique of Kantian ethics 
in particular is neither the sole nor even the main reason for the adoption of an im-
manent doctrine of ethics. the rejection of Kant is, after all, only the negative part of 
Hegel’s argument which grounds the idea of Sittlichkeit. the positive reason resides in 
the consequences of Hegel’s theory of action and the requirements of the concept of 
recognition. the transition from the moral point of view to social ethics, that is from 
Moralität to Sittlichkeit, in Hegel’s system is internally motivated by the position adopted 
in the discussion of a theory of action in the first part of Moralität (which, in turn, is a 
necessary consequence of Hegel’s theory of punishment outlined in the latter part of 
Abstract Right), and not just due to the contradictions that arise from the moral point of 
view itself. it is commonly held that it is Hegel’s continued attack on Kantian morality 
and, above all, on the empty formalism of the categorical imperative that motivates his 
postulation of an immanent, as opposed to a transcendental, doctrine of duty.6 Hegel 
     2. the most familiar, if one of the least sophisticated, version of this caricature of Hegel is Karl popper, 
The Open Society and its Enemies vol. 2, 2 vols., 3rd ed., london, routledge, 1957, chapters 11 and 12. see Wal-
ter Kaufmann, ‘the Hegel myth and its method’, The Hegel Myths and Legends, in j. stewart (ed.), evanston, 
northwestern university press , 1996 for a comprehensive rebuttal of popper. the best and most convincing 
contemporary account of the charge of philosophical conservatism can be found in ernst tugendhat, Self-
consciousness and Self-determination, trans. p. stern, london, mit press, 1986, chapters 13 and 14. 
     3. michael jackson, ‘Hegel: the real and the rational’, in j. stewart (ed.), The Hegel Myths and Legends. 
     4. stephen Houlgate, ‘Hegel’s ethical thought’, Bulletin of  the Hegel Society of  Great Britain, 25, 1-17; dudley 
Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of  Right, london, routledge, 2002, chapter 8; Westphal, Kenneth, ‘Hegel’s 
critique of Kant’s moral World view’, Philosophical Topics, vol. 19, no. 2, 1991, pp. 133-175; allen Wood, 
Hegel’s Ethical Thought, cambridge, cambridge university press, 1990, chapters 9-10.
     5. a second method for the discussion of Hegelian social ethics and the role of the subjective conscience 
resides in the requirements of freedom as put forward in the introduction to pr, so that the conditions 
of subjective and objective freedom are traced back to the need for the moral subject to be ‘at home’ in 
his or her culture. see michael Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of  Reconciliation, cambridge, 
cambridge university press, 1994; frederick neuhouser, Foundations of  Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Free-
dom, london, Harvard university press, 2000; and alan patten, Hegel’s Idea of  Freedom, oxford, oxford 
university press, 1999. i want to reach the same conclusion, but by approaching the problem in the other 
direction, that is by showing the direction Hegel takes (from free-will, to abstract right, to action, to morality 
and then to social right) needs to be better understood.
     6. for Hegel’s criticisms of Kant’s moral will, see g. W. f. Hegel, ‘on the scientific Ways of treating nat-
cosmos and History172
proposes that motivations for right action cannot originate nor be derived from tran-
scendental reason, so the story goes, and so the only alternative is that determinations 
of the will are to be found in the agent’s institutional roles within the rational state: the 
subject’s duties are found embedded in Sittlichkeit, his ethical substance or moral fabric.7 
and it is the explicitly social origin of moral motivation which has led to the diverse 
interpretations and judgements on Hegel’s account of the role of the subjective con-
science within the rational state which, when coupled with the rejection of the liberal 
Kantian political programme, ground the accusation of political quietism: if a subject 
finds liberation through the fulfilment of his social role, then any protest grounded in 
the moral conscience is seemingly ruled out since to protest is to fail to fulfil one’s role. 
so, alternatively, many Hegel scholars feel the need to celebrate the role of the moral 
conscience and describe it as a necessary attribute of the rational state and, if it is ab-
sent, then neither the individual nor the state is fully free. the aim of this paper is see 
whether the issue concerning the role of the moral conscience in Hegel’s social theory 
can be answered through an exploration of one of the building blocks in his account of 
the rational state (that is, his much neglected theory of moral action) and to show the 
role it has to play in establishing subjective claims at the heart of his social ethics.8 the 
ambitious agenda of this piece is, on the one hand, to demonstrate that the concept of 
Sittlichkeit is not only an alternative to transcendental ethics, but is necessarily entailed by 
the adoption of the modern moral point of view (in much the same way that the realm 
of ‘abstract right’ requires the realm of morality to make sense of the concepts of crime 
and coercion, so, too, does ‘morality’ require the concept of an immanent doctrine of 
duty to make sense of free, human action); and, on the other, to show that the chal-
lenge that Hegel is, at best, a quietist and, at worst, a reactionary is incompatible with a 
proper understanding of his political system as a whole and, hence, stress that the moral 
conscience is a necessary and integral part of the rational state since, otherwise, Hegel’s 
ural law, on its place in practical philosophy, and its relation to the positive sciences of right’, in laurence 
dickey and H. b. nisbet (eds.), Political Writings, trans. H. b. nisbet, cambridge, cambridge, 1999, pp. 102-
80, part ii (henceforth nl); g. W. f. Hegel, Elements of  the Philosophy of  Right, allen Wood (ed.), trans. H. 
b. nisbet, cambridge, cambridge university press, 1996, §§133-140 (henceforth pr); and g. W. f. Hegel, 
Philosophy of  Mind: Being Part Three of  the Encyclopaedia of  the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Together with the Zusätze, 
trans. William Wallace and a. v. miller, oxford, oxford, 1971, §§508-512 (henceforth epm). for the con-
temporary debate itself, one should refer to Henry allison, Kant’s Theory of  Freedom, cambridge, cambridge 
university press, 1990, especially chapter ten; Karl ameriks, ‘the Hegelian critique of Kantian morality’, 
in b. den ouden & m. marcia (eds.), New Essays on Kant, new york, peter lang, 1987; chrsitine Korsgaard, 
Creating the Kingdom of  Ends, cambridge, cambridge university press, 1996, chapter three; onora o’neill, 
Constructions of  Reason, cambridge, cambridge university press, 1989, part two; timothy o’Hagan, ‘on 
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral and political philosophy’ in s. priest (ed.), Hegel’s Critique of  Kant, oxford, 
clarendon; 1987; robert pippin, Idealism as Modernism cambridge, cambridge university press, 1997, part 
one; Kenneth Westphal, ‘Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral World view’, Philosophical Topics, vol. 19, no. 2, 
1991, pp. 133-175 and allen Wood, ‘the emptiness of the moral Will’, Monist vol. 72, 1989, pp. 454-483.
     7. such a story does not tell us why other alternatives are not considered: motivations of a moral sense, 
human nature, pleasure and so on. of course, Hegel does, see most notably nl and pr §140 r.
     8. Knowles, Hegel and the Philosophy of  Right, pp. 362-63; michael Quante, Hegel’s Concept of  Action, cam-
bridge, cambridge university press, 2004, p. 1. Quante’s own book goes a long way to rectify this neglect.
david rose 173
own conditions of free action would not be met.
2 tHe tHeory of action
my main claim in this section is that Hegel offers, in his mature lectures on right (pr 
§§ 105-140; epm §§ 503-12), a hermeneutical theory of action. acts express something 
particular about the agent by communicating his or her intention to an ideal other 
who, to use an apt metaphor, is able to ‘read’ the inner self from the outer expression.9 
the advantages of this reading reside in its consistency with the Hegelian concepts of 
recognition and homeliness as well as grounding the necessary existence of the modern, 
moral conscience implicitly within the fully rational state. 
it is pertinent to begin with an idea of what we would expect from a theory of action. 
in the first instance, a theory of action ought to be able to adequately identify a subset of 
events properly described as acts from a more general set of occurrences. Hegel, like any 
theorist of action, starts from the simplest intuition: the subset of events that are properly 
termed actions are those that are brought about by an agent. so, in its simplest form, a 
theory of action will identify those events which the agent does as actions. the formal 
way to conceive of an action is any event for which the agent claims responsibility or 
identifies as his or her own (pr § 115). the idea of responsibility put in play at the outset 
reveals what we should expect from Hegel: he is ultimately interested in the evaluation 
and justification of actions (moral action), and not just the explication of action (action 
per se).10 His theory of action arises from a consideration of the responsible subject. 
the emphasis on the evaluation of actions is consistent with the claim that He-
gel is concerned with full blooded or moral action and not just human action and is 
supported by the location of his discussion of action within his lectures on right. the 
transition embodied in the chapter on ‘morality’—that is the systematic developmental 
and historical transition from person to moral subject—arises from the requirements of 
abstract right and, in particular, punishment. for once an individual person has rights 
and a territory (covering both physical integrity and private possessions), then violations 
of this legal space require reparation. intentional behaviour demands to be treated differ-
ently from accidental damage (a flood), the consequences of animalistic (wild savagery), 
immature (the infant who decides to colour in one’s favourite persian rug) or neurotic 
behaviour (kleptomania) (pr § 99 a). the criminal is differentiated from all these other 
(merely) grammatical subjects due to the responsibility he bears for his own will and our 
treatment of him depends upon the proper interpretation of an intentional action: to 
what extent is the criminal responsible and what, then, is the appropriate response. the 
concepts of ‘abstract right’ are inadequate to deal with the proper response to crime 
and even hard placed to differentiate between crime and deception (pr § 103). such 
evaluation requires a theory of action with its explanation of how, when and to what 
     9. a very good account of this type of theory is paul ricoeur, ‘the model of the text: meaningful action 
considered as a text’, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences trans. j. thompson, cambridge, cambridge 
university press, 1981. 
     10. see the introduction to Quante, Hegel’s Concept of  Action.
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extent the subject is responsible for his or her actions and the ‘person’ identifies only the 
individual will, independent of the clan or tribe, which has a given rather than a chosen 
content. for Hegel, then, a discussion of morality in its broadest sense is entailed by the 
rights and prohibitions of ‘abstract right’ because the discussion of action in that section 
is formal and at odds with his retributivist justification for punishment (lnr § 56).11 if 
action were merely caused by the content of one’s will, then punishment could only be 
a form of deterrence or rehabilitation. the person who acts due to neurosis or genetic 
predisposition, that is the person who could not have done otherwise, is not responsible 
in any robust sense. as such, the aim of punishment practices would be either to protect 
others from his behaviour (like building a sandbag wall to protect property from a flood) 
or to change the person’s behaviour (as one would domesticate an animal). but, punish-
ment is most rationally comprehended as retribution and such a concept requires the 
notion of responsibility and moral desert to be rationally grounded (epm § 503).
Hegel summarizes his theory of moral action in one dense paragraph which sets out 
the conditions of moral action pertaining to a subject as opposed to action pertaining to 
a person:
the expression of the will as subjective or moral is action. action contains the 
following determinations: (α) it must be known by me in its externality as mine; (β) 
its essential relation to the concept is one of obligation; and (γ) it has an essential 
relation to the will of others (pr § 113).
the first determination (α) is familiar: an event is an action if the agent’s intention plays 
a causal role and the agent is aware of it. the right of knowledge (α) is the condition 
that the agent must recognize an event as being produced by him or herself for it to be 
an action as opposed to an event. 
freedom is understood as freedom-in-itself in ‘abstract right’: a person is free if he 
or she can satisfy personal wants and desires even if these wants are immediate inclina-
tions or blind obedience to the dictates of authority. yet, even within this sphere, it is 
possible to distinguish actions from mere events: ‘its utterance in deed with this freedom 
is as action, in the externality of which it only admits as its own, and allows to be imput-
ed to it, so much as it has consciously willed.’ (epm § 503) only those events admitted 
as one’s own are actions, that is events to which the agent ascribes himself or herself as 
the author. such self-ascription is, in the first instance, nothing but the identification of 
a reason conceived of as an intention in the set of causal conditions necessary for bring-
ing about the event (epm § 504). thus, the agent can distinguish between deliberately 
knocking a man off his ladder (‘i wanted to because he had ogled my wife’) and involun-
tarily knocking a man off his ladder (‘it wasn’t my fault, i tripped on the carpet.’)12 the 
     11. g. W. f. Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of  Right: Heidelberg, 1817-
1818, with Additions From the Lectures of  1818-1819, trans. j. michael stewart and peter c. Hodgson, berkeley, 
university of california press, 1995. see david rose, Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right, london, continuum press, 
2007, pp. 69-77.
     12. to reinforce this understanding, Hegel distinguishes between the deed and the action. Wood, Hegel’s 
Ethical Thought, p. 140 sees no significance in the use of the word ‘deed’, whereas Quante, Hegel’s Concept of  
Action, p. 105 claims that ‘deed’ captures the event-event characterization of actions and ‘action’ the moral 
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subject is responsible for the occurrence to which the predicate ‘mine’ can be attached 
and which is traceable to the subject’s intention. if we can reconstruct a desire and be-
lief as an intention that played a casual role in bringing about the event, then we can 
identify an action (pr § 115).
However, Hegel wants subjects to be held responsible for their actions in order to 
distribute praise and blame as demanded by the retributivist theory of punishment. the 
first determination of free action on its own is unable to fulfil this goal since it ‘fails to 
cast the agent in his proper role’.13 reasons, that is dispositions and beliefs, cause an inten-
tion which causes an action, but the agent just does not feature and it is agents we hold 
responsible and not their beliefs and dispositions. so, reasons must effect something 
(viz. an agent) in order to become intentions and since reasons do not always produce 
the same intention in differing agents, something is missing in the causal explanation in 
order to make it plausible. of course, one could cite the agents’ differing webs of beliefs 
as the differentiating factor in diverse responses, but it is still possible for an agent to be 
moved by beliefs despite himself. cases such as coercion and addiction feature an agent 
who is in accordance with the standard model (‘i believe the robber’s gun is loaded and 
i do not want to die’; ‘i am in a state of wanting and i believe that the drug will allevi-
ate this’), but, phenomenologically, these stories do not seem to capture the real nature 
of human action.14 it makes intuitive sense to say that ‘it was not me’ or ‘i wasn’t acting 
on my own will’ and such statements do have a legal—if not metaphysical—resonance. 
coercion and addiction have been problematic for the empiricist model since Hobbes 
and the only real response is to say that the model of action proposed explains, but does 
not evaluate the actions of agents in terms of intentions. evaluation must rest on contro-
versial doctrines such as free-will or responsibility and these concepts play no role in the 
explanation of action.15 in other words, there is no way on this simple causal model to 
distinguish human action or full-blooded action from animal action or non-intentional action. 
the distinction between animal and human action maps neatly onto the Hegelian person 
versus subject dichotomy: with the former, the content of the will is given, whereas with 
the latter the content is chosen and hence is the subject’s in the genitive sense. Hegel 
captures this determination of full-blooded moral action with his second determination 
(β).
the phenomenology of human action involves reference to the agent and the em-
piricist model appears to negate this aspiration. to account for cases of coercion and 
false consciousness, the subject has to freely endorse his or her end for the action to be 
element (α + β).
     13. david velleman, ‘What happens when someone acts?’, in The Possibility of  Practical Reason, oxford, 
oxford university press, 2002, p. 123.
     14. Harry frankfurt, ‘coercion and moral responsibility’, in The Importance of  What We Care About, cam-
bridge, cambridge university press, 1988.
     15. ‘Hegel regarded the metaphysical conflict between freedom and determinism as basically a pseudo-
problem generated by importing mechanical accounts of causality into the domain of action, where they 
are inappropriate. understanding and explaining action requires teleological explanation, of both func-
tional and purposive varieties.’ Westphal, ‘Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral World view’, p. 148.
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properly his or her own. Hegel puts this in terms of obligation: the intention is to be 
known as a good-for-me (β). in the case of coercion, the bank teller has a conflict of 
goods: self-preservation versus fulfilling his role. the former motivation trumps the lat-
ter but the agent is not free because he is not acting from his own will, it is the presence 
of an external factor which obstructs his free action. 
What is more Hegel’s motivation for formalizing a theory of action is, as has already 
been stated, so that punishment practices can be rationalized. both of the statements 
‘i did it’ and ‘it was an act i brought about in the world’ seems to invoke the agent in 
the causal chain and not just elements (beliefs and dispositions) which can be identified 
with the agent. the difference between a person and a subject is that he or she must 
somehow endorse those actions as his or her own. What Hegel recognizes about a pure 
causal explanation is that it is only partial and cannot, if lauded as the be all and end 
all of human action, supply the foundations for proper moral evaluation. Hegel’s ac-
count needs to talk of actions and degrees of agent participation in order to distinguish 
between cases of coercion, deception and crime. for, although it is able to explain an 
action, the causal model’s explanations are inadequate to ground an evaluative judge-
ment. one needs to move away from the person (a collection of given dispositions and 
beliefs) to the subject (the agent who is ‘at home’ with his intentions and motivations):
freedom is only present where there is no other for me that is not myself. the 
natural man, who is determined only by his drives, is not at home with himself; 
however self-willed he may be, the content of his willing and opining is not his own, 
and his freedom is only a formal one (el § 23 a2).16
the natural man (and the person) is akin to the coerced agent and all are ‘self-willed’: 
free if he is able to act on the content of his will and not free if he is obstructed from do-
ing so. However, there is no full responsibility since the content of the will is given and 
ultimately no different from external causes, psychoses, neuroses and the will of others 
imposed on one. full blooded human action involves the proper recognition that what 
one did, one wanted to do and would justify it if asked.
Hegel expresses these very sentiments in his second determination (β). the animal 
has no choice but to obey its desires, neither does the small child; they bear little re-
sponsibility for their actions. subjective freedom for them—like the person—resides in 
the satisfaction of the will’s desire whatever its content may be. Human action is different 
in that certain desires and preferences are privileged even if they are not so pressing 
and these can be articulated as values.17 furthermore, values need not be exclusively 
moral since responsibility concerns all self-regarding actions (self-interest, prudence and 
morality). the process of the rationalization of desires permits the recognition of the 
‘good’ of the subject’s purpose, be it moral or prudential, and he perceives it not only as 
     16. Hegel, g. W. f., The Encyclopaedia Logic (1830), with the Zusätze: Part I of  the Encyclopaedia of  Philosophical 
Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. theodore f. geraets, W. a. suchting, and H. s. Harris, indianapolis, Hackett, 
1991 (henceforth el).
     17. the contemporary characterization would be second-order desires. see Harry frankfurt, ‘freedom of 
the will and the concept of a person’ and charles taylor, ‘responsibility for self ’ both in g. Watson (ed.), 
Free Will, oxford, oxford university press, 1982.
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a desire to be satisfied (personal freedom) but a desire worth satisfying (moral freedom). 
and this means we can now evaluate rather than just explain an action. We identify the 
role of the agent’s intention in the causes bringing about the event, and then are able to 
say whether or not the action is properly the agent’s own if he or she wanted it to be the 
case (that is, posits it as a purpose). responsibility requires that subjects self-consciously 
know and freely choose their purposes for the predicate ‘mine’ to be attached to the 
action. an explanation of action requires no real notion of freedom, but an evaluation 
of action does. in dialogue, the actor would admit what he did as his own and his good 
and not the good of an alien will acting through him (coercion, false consciousness, and 
so on).
and the significance of ‘homeliness’ dovetails with the second consideration of the 
location of the discussion of action in the lectures. Hegel’s theory of action mediates 
the sections ‘abstract right’ (the recognition and identification of individual persons 
as rights-bearers with particular desires) and ‘ethical life’ (the positive duties and ob-
ligations of the citizen in the rational state). Without the historical and philosophical 
emergence of the person (a distinct and discrete element of the tribe), there would be 
no possibility of the subjective freedom of ‘i (as individual) want x’ and without the im-
manent doctrine of duties proposed by Sittlichkeit, the good-for-me and the good-for-all 
of the rational social being would not be harmonious and free. the ancient greeks 
had a one-sided existence and were not fully free because the ethical substance they 
inhabited was, in some sense, not theirs. their social fabric and values were justified in 
themselves, but the agents motivated by them took the values as given and natural (lpH 
106-7).18 the subjectivity of the person (this is ‘my’ good irrespective of the dictates and 
roles of my social existence) is also one-sided since although the content of one’s will is 
one’s own, it is not necessarily rational and if unconstrained by moral concerns would 
lead to disastrous social atomism (pr § 236 r). the subject, the moral point of view, 
demands more than the wishes and aspirations of the mere person: he or she is aware 
that actions have to obey positive obligations, the ‘good’, to truly express his or her iden-
tity to others. moral freedom is a precondition of social freedom: ethical life is not mine 
until i as moral agent recognize it as a good and in order to do this, i must be a moral 
agent who can rationally endorse it. to be ‘at home’ in one’s social fabric is to recognize 
one’s rights and duties as one’s own and rational and this requires the capacity of doing 
or being otherwise, a possibility inconceivable to the ancient greeks. 
the transition from person to moral (in a broad sense) subject allows one to distin-
guish between fully free actions and coerced actions:
particular self-determination, as the inward self-determination of the will that is 
for itself, and as a mode of self-determination that is intended to be realized, is 
known by the subject and is its purpose; [it is] a judgment that in its determinacy 
comprises universal thought. the disposition is the universality as belonging to the 
subject; and, as singled out and set apart on its own account, it is the maxim of the 
     18. g. W. f. Hegel, the philosophy of History, trans. j. sibree, new york, dover publications, 1956 
(henceforth lHp).
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subjective will. once right is enacted, the disposition is of no essential significance 
for it (lnr § 53).
the identification of me in the action is as a self-willed unit. the responsibility of the 
agent resides in bringing about those purposes which are his own and trying to falter 
those that are not. i am responsible for actions that emanate from reasons that are my 
own. 19 reasons that are my own are best conceived of as purposes: purposes correspond 
to what the agent sees as good and the bank teller who gives money to the robber does 
not see this as a good even if he has a reason playing a causal role in why he gives money 
to the robber. He can explain why he did it, but he can—intelligibly—state that he did 
not want to do so because it was contrary to the obligations of his institutional role. and 
the Kantian resonances in the above quotation cannot be ignored: both the weak-willed 
bank teller who submits to the robber and the strong-willed one who does not can ex-
plain their actions in terms of dispositions (fear and rectitude respectively), but only the 
latter can separate a maxim worthy of moral approbation.
so, the second determination, (β), is seemingly consistent with Kant and the evalu-
ation of the agent via their intentions. the idea of intentions and obligations resonates 
with Kant’s good will and the voice of conscience, but Hegel does not want the idea of 
right to rest on the idea of the otherly out there, that is Kant’s transcendental idealism.20 
However, at this stage of the argument, the parallels are striking:
this subjective or ‘moral’ freedom is what a european especially calls freedom. 
in virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the 
distinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles shall 
not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to 
be obeyed, but have their assent, recognition, or even justification in his heart, 
sentiment, conscience, intelligence, etc. the subjectivity of the will in itself is its 
supreme aim and absolutely essential to it (epm § 503).
Here, Hegel is offering his own version of the Kantian characterization of enlighten-
ment, and one cannot fail to see the parallel with Kant’s earlier portrayal of the spirit 
of his age as the ‘age of criticism’.21 it is significant to note that the claim of the enlight-
enment is the identifying mark of moral freedom: it is the coming to age of man. to 
use a traditional analogy, man has grown into maturity and no longer need rely on the 
dictates of authority or the motivations of immediate inclination (including social char-
acter). the subjective ascription of ‘good’ or value to an end is necessary to free action 
for Hegel.
traditionally these two determinations (α + β) have been held to be necessary and 
sufficient conditions for free action, yet Hegel adds his third determination (γ): the in-
tention has to be capable of reconstruction by others from the objectivity of the act 
     19. this is taylor’s understanding of Hegel’s theory of action: the human is a purposive being but one 
whose purposes are known and endorsed by itself. see charles taylor, ‘Hegel’s concept of mind’, in Human 
Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1, cambridge, cambridge university press, 1985.
     20. Westphal, ‘Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral World view’.
     21. immanuel Kant, The Critique of  Pure Reason, trans. j. meiklejohn & revised v. politis, london, j m 
dent, 1993, pp. aix-xi.
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itself. Hegel feels it is necessary to not only retain the traditional concept of the right 
of knowledge, but also temper it with an objective constraint. one reason he does so is 
that, ultimately, Kant’s picture fails because it cannot generate purposes a priori or re-
solve conflicting goods, but Hegel does not introduce his famous Kantian critique here. 
instead the reader is offered positive reasons for the adoption of an immanent doctrine 
of ethics grounded in the Hegelian concept of recognition. it is necessary that others 
recognize the action as one’s own. the action must express the implicit humanity (obli-
gation) rather than appear to be a mere, immediate purpose (wilfulness) and this entails 
that others must concur with me and my description of the good, otherwise they will 
continue to treat me under the category of personhood or worse. intention, therefore, 
requires recognition by others: ‘the implementation of my end therefore has this iden-
tity of my will and the will of others within in it—it has a positive reference to the will of 
others.’ (pr § 112) the first-person may be the judge of what is good, but his judgement 
is constrained by the interpretation of the other. the agent has to be aware that his act 
ought to accord with the expectations of his form of life, otherwise his intention will be 
either misdescribed or ignored.
one way to characterize this is to say that the justification of one’s good or end 
involves one in the activity of reason-giving and this activity is, for Hegel, inherently 
social. affirming what is substantially right and good is not a matter of external, tran-
scendental standards independent of one’s peers, but rests on their recognition of the 
content of one’s will in terms of articulated and shared categories of right.22 there are no 
constraints on a will which justifies a good or a purpose to itself, one is able to convince 
oneself that anything may be good (pr §140 r). reasons for action require a degree of 
objectivity for Hegel and this is based on reasons being a justification for all men who 
share my way of life rather than just for me; that is, an actual reason rather than just 
wilfulness and, contrary to Kant, one’s role, situation and circumstances all constitute 
reasons for behaviour. in offering reasons, the agent knows if they are good reasons if 
he can convince others. it follows from this that the agent’s description of his intention 
must harmonize with the other’s interpretation of the act. a man unaware of the way in 
which a certain act will be interpreted, that is how his reasons for action will be recon-
structed (the tourist abroad) is not responsible for any offence caused (although he may 
still be held culpable).23 reciprocally, the agent is only fully free when he is aware how 
his action will be interpreted. the will of others contained in one’s own will is this shared 
scheme of interpretation in and through which we reconstruct intentions.
the rational reformulation of the initial determinations of action (pr § 113) occurs 
in a later paragraph which reduces the dialectical trinity to a new symmetry of subjec-
tive and objective aspects:
the right of intention is that the universal quality of the action shall have being 
     22. neuhouser convincingly traces this element of Hegel’s thought back to rousseau’s influence, see Foun-
dations of  Hegel’s Social Theory.
     23. His culpability is a legal issue arising form the consideration of what an agent ought to know on setting 
foot within a state.
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not only in itself, but shall be known by the agent and thus have been present 
all along in his subjective will; and conversely, what we may call the right of the 
objectivity of the action is the right of the action to assert itself as known and willed 
by the subject as a thinking agent (pr § 120).
Here we find that self-ascription of intentions, or the right of knowledge (α), is combined 
with the necessary element of modern moral freedom (β) into the ‘right of intention’ 
such that the agent will only be held responsible for those actions deliberately brought 
about by his or her own will, thus ruling out external causality, neurotic behaviour, 
coercion, deception and false consciousness. However, in order to recognize one’s inten-
tions as ‘good’ or ‘rational’ requires the reformulation of (γ) into the ‘right of objectivity’. 
an action is—independently of the protestations and affirmations of the agent him or 
herself—to ‘stand in for’ or ‘represent’ the will of the agent in the ‘outer’ world, just as 
the word uttered in language is assumed to be a sincere representation of the thought 
and will of the speaker who is present. if the agent wishes to be understood as a free 
moral agent, then he or she must be aware that an action requires a commitment to the 
medium through which others will understand it. so, in order to affirm one’s freedom, 
there must exist a minimum level of expectation which must be met. if the subject’s acts 
are to be the expression of inwardness, then he must be certain that the other is going to 
reconstruct them faithfully. both actor and interpreter must, therefore, share a common 
understanding of the way in which acts are to be rendered intelligible. 
the first two determinations of free action are not sufficient to justify an action 
because, without the moment of certain recognition of the moral will, the agent cannot be 
held fully and morally responsible as demanded by the retributivist theory of punish-
ment. recognition, it ought to be recalled, is not just granted by the struggle to death, 
even if that story makes stark what is at stake: i demonstrate to you that i am free over 
and above my desires by risking the most fundamental drive for the sake of a principle 
(ps ¶¶ 178-196).24 such recognition of one’s essential rationality and humanity can al-
ternatively be granted by marriage, whereby the agent sincerely places altruistic and 
universal needs over particular and egoistic ones (pr § 162). Without the self-certainty 
granted by knowledge of the inter-subjective categories of the right of objectivity, the 
subject would be unsure whether or not he has been properly recognized or if his inten-
tion can be reconstructed faithfully from his action. in a rational social order, the agent 
knows the good in question because it is made immediately available to him through 
fulfilling his roles in the family (parent, child), civil society (worker) and the state (citizen). 
if i wish to be known as a good father, then my acts must accord with those judgements 
which accompany a good parent (love, generosity, discipline) and not those which are 
generally frowned upon (indifference, prodigality, severity). the significance of the right 
of objectivity resides in the certainty of recognition and one’s social fabric is a liberation 
     24. g. W. f.Hegel, The Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. a.v. miller, new york, oxford, 1977. see alexandre 
Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of  Hegel, 2nd ed., trans. j. nichols, london, basic books inc., 1969 and, for 
a full discussion of the concept of recognition, see robert Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of  Recognition, london, 
university of california press, 1997.
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because it makes possible—and does not inhibit—free moral action.
the conclusions to the all too brief discussion of Hegel’s theory of action are not 
to be underestimated. the right of knowledge (α) is familiar from most theories of ac-
tion, but the right of intention (α combined with β) makes it obvious that the moral 
conscience, that is the subject’s right to decide his or her good—in which values he or 
she feels ‘at home’—is a necessary condition of the rational state for without it rational, 
free action would not be possible and Hegel’s theory of punishment would be incongru-
ous. Hence, any institutions or practices of the state which motivated citizens without 
being evaluated by the standards of personal freedom would make it impossible to feel 
‘at home’. the right of objectivity (γ) sets the limits and conditions of possible subjective 
endorsement: any deviation from the norm must be justified by familiar standards and 
not by an appeal to mere wilfulness. one cannot rely on an incoherent noumenal realm 
to dictate right action and good ends, but one can interrogate one’s social roles and 
meanings for a way to express one’s particularity through a universal medium.25
and here one should take note of the fact these discussions, prior to any substantial 
consideration of Kantian or subjective ethics, invite the Hegelian reader to appreciate 
the moral conscience as necessary and operative in the rational state as well as recogniz-
ing that ethical action entails an immanent and not transcendental doctrine of duties, 
although the latter claim has still to be made apparent. for these points cast light on one 
of Hegel’s most controversial remarks:
the right to recognize nothing that i do not perceive as rational is the highest 
right of the subject, but by virtue of its subjective determination, it is at the same 
time formal; on the other hand, the right of the rational—as the objective—over 
the subject remains firmly established (pr § 132 r).
subjective social freedom, the moral conscience of the citizen, is necessary for the sub-
ject to feel ‘at home’ within his or her state and is, hence, the ‘highest right’. yet, if it is 
unable to generate the ‘good’ from its own reason, it must rely on the objective freedom 
of Sittlichkeit as those shared meanings and values operative in the practical reasoning of 
oneself and one’s peers coupled with those social practices and material arrangements 
which make self-determination possible.26. 
3 tHe necessity of tHe rigHt of objectivity for responsibil-
ity
in his lecture notes, Hegel introduces the right of objectivity and its relation to the 
rational order prior to the critique of Kant in particular and subjective moralities in 
general. the latter arguments are supposed to support the already articulated claim that 
free, moral action is impossible without a medium of immanently shared values and 
     25. Here is a rather playful, but illuminating example. Without the rules of football, the determinations 
that dictate right action on the field of play (rules and expectations in their broadest sense), maradona 
would never have been. yet, nothing about those rules, expectations and history could have determined 
what was unique about him.
     26. neuhouser, Foundations of  Hegel’s Social Theory, chapter 5.
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good rather than ground it. one could imagine a hand being raised in the class room 
and a courageous student asking Hegel whether he had considered the alternative that 
right action could be known and willed by the subject from reason alone. to which, the 
professor would reply with the negative reason for the appropriation of an immanent 
doctrine of duty: the point by point attack on transcendental morality.27 it would be 
pertinent just to offer a brief reminder of these points, as Hegel presents them: one, the 
subjective will cannot overcome conflicts of duty (whether generated by different kinds 
of duty or self-interest and duty) (epm § 508-9); two, the moral point of view has to be 
constrained because it is infinitely powerful and can posit (or negate) any good what-
soever as universal good.(epm §§ 510-11; pr § 140); and, three, the subject is unable to 
generate determinations of the will out of his reflective understanding, its abstractness 
needs to be overcome by objective determinations (epm §§ 506, 508; pr § 135).
Hegel is oddly (for once) making an appeal to our intuitive grasp of the phenomenon 
of moral action. take the tired and worn out old example of the mother who has to 
decide whether or not to steal to feed her starving child. the immediate determination 
of the family, the naturally binding duty of the maternal bond, gives rise to the desire 
to protect, feed and sustain the child. this is the good-for-mother. yet, her role in civil 
society determines that she recognize the rationality of the right to property and this, 
too, is a good. the universality of good means that these two goods should harmonize, 
yet the moral conscience is quite able to accept one as right at the expense of the other 
in one moment, then—in the next second—to reverse such a description. for Hegel, 
the moral conscience itself cannot decide between conflicting determinations of the will 
and, if it does so, such a decision is wholly arbitrary and wilful. and if this is the case, 
then there is no standard by which the agent can be distinguished from the person who 
acts on a given content of the will (pr § 17). Hegel’s solution is to make a demand on 
one’s immanent set of duties and values and ask what it is that gives rise to the conflict in 
the first place. that a child be fed is a good and that the right of property be respected 
is a good, so such a society in which a conflict between these two is felt, is not rational. 
the conflict can only be overcome when objective freedom, granted by the institutions 
of ethical life, eradicates the existence of the mother’s need to steal and her subjective 
freedom can be satisfied. (through the supply of basic needs as a right (the welfare state) 
and the eradication of poverty, or legal recognition of her subjective freedom adjudi-
cated in a court.)
Hegel realizes that the abstract nature of the good cannot be created from the top 
down and theoretically tested. it is not truly possible for the agent to declare what the 
world ought to be like in all certainty given the dictates of reason. instead, the moral 
subject must begin from the existing world and its institutions since the constraint of 
objectivity involves the idea that the good must be intelligible to these institutions since 
the judgements of my peers is necessary for my action to be free. only in such a way can 
subjective freedom meet the constraint of objective freedom and, reciprocally, it is this 
     27. see ameriks, ‘the Hegelian critique of Kantian morality’, and Westphal, ‘Hegel’s critique of Kant’s 
moral World view’.
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very objective freedom which grants the subject the certainty of recognition he requires 
to satisfy his actions. therefore, it is only the ethical person who is truly free:
the ethical person is conscious of the content of his action as something necessary, 
something that is valid in and for itself, and this consciousness is so far from 
diminishing freedom, that, on the contrary, it is only through this consciousness 
that his abstract freedom becomes a freedom that is actual and rich in content, as 
distinct from freedom of choice [Willkür], a freedom that still lacks content and is 
merely possible (el § 158 a).
the objective freedom of ethical life makes possible the satisfaction of rational desires, 
projects and aspirations and this is an elaboration of the right of objectivity present in 
the abstract theory of action; a right which renders apparent the requirement of shared 
categories from which the subjective intention can reliably be reconstructed (as in the 
case of the mother). ethical life is the substantial description of the possible determina-
tions of one of its members and is, then, liberation because it purifies and rationalizes 
the drives of the individual (pr § 19). objective freedom is freedom because it liberates 
the subject in three ways: one, from a dependence on immediate drives; two, from hav-
ing to produce the categories for comprehension (values, rights and duties) for himself ex 
nihilo; and, three, from the need to determine good from his own conscience (pr § 149). 
the three institutions of modern society—that is, the liberal, bourgeois family, civil so-
ciety and the modern political state—all combine to fulfil these conditions of objective 
freedom. it is these determinations of ethical life which constitute the objective freedom 
of the subject in that they enable him to satisfy his desires, wants and aspirations, to 
simultaneously pursue the good and to be certain of recognition by the other (epm § 
538). Hegel’s claim, then, is that the subject as he has described it in ‘morality’ can only 
be fully free when his or her objective freedom is secured by these modern institutions.28 
Sittlichkeit is, in one of its aspects, the world constructed by social reasons for actions. 29 
it supplies motivations and obligations for the agent in virtue of his membership and his 
role in this institutional order and also makes possible recognition of him as a free-self-
determining being (pr § 151; epm § 513).
an immanent doctrine of duties and values overcomes the abstract and formal na-
ture of the ‘ought’ which results from the subjective will: ‘thus, without any selective 
reflection, the person performs duty as his own and as something which is; and in this 
necessity he has himself and his actual freedom’ (eg § 514). the member of Sittlichkeit 
can perform his duties—possibly from habit, that is without any ‘selective reflection’—
because they constitute his identity and he feels ‘at home’. it is not how he should act, 
it is how he does act (i drive on the left because i am english) and he can be certain of 
recognition as an agent through fulfilling the dictates of these roles:
all these substantial determinations are duties which are binding on the will of 
     28. i have not argued in this essay why it has to be these three institutions, neither do i feel that there 
are no other alternatives (or, in fact, that these are actually absolutely rational in Hegel’s sense). but these 
remarks cannot be discussed here.
     29. it must also be the material conditions necessary for free, self-determining action.
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the individual; for the individual, as subjective and inherently undetermined—or 
determined in a particular way—is distinct from them and consequently stands in a 
relationship to them as to his own substantial being (pr § 148).
the certain recognition of free action is made possible by the objective social order em-
bedded in institutions coupled with the substantial identity of the agent as a member of 
these institutions, but the above quotation makes clear that the right of intention is still 
significant. the modern subject, unlike the greek citizen, is ‘inherently undetermined’ 
and ‘distinct’ from his ‘own substantial being’. according to Hegel, if one is committed 
to the evaluation of actions (and one must be if one is postulating a retributivist theory 
of judgement), then this commitment entails an immanent doctrine of duties, values and 
meanings; that is, Sittlichkeit.30
4 tHe dangers of tHe purely objective Will
the aim of this paper was to show that Hegel’s immanent doctrine of duty arose not 
just from his rejection of transcendental ethics but also from his own account of human 
moral action. i believe i have shown above that Hegel’s theory of action necessarily 
requires objective freedom which can only be supplied by Sittlichkeit even if i have not 
gone into the fine details of his account of ethical substance. in justifying this claim it 
was also hoped that the limits of the moral conscience within the rational state could be 
delineated and its power described.
the worry, of course, arises from the above quotation where Hegel tells us that Sit-
tlichkeit is immediately motivating through habit or second nature ‘without any selective 
reflection’ (epm § 514). the right of the rational, after all, was to be ‘firmly established’ 
and it is clear that Hegel’s theory of action implicitly involves the notion of Sittlichkeit in 
that the moral agent requires objective determination to be certain of recognition and, 
hence, to be fully responsible. in order to be recognized as free my action must meet the 
expectations of my peers, yet this seems to implicitly rule out any abnormal behaviour 
and protest is, one would assume, always a break from the norm and the expected.31 it is 
the objective, rational structure of Hegel’s account of Sittlichkeit which grounds the con-
     30. i do not want to give the impression that ethical life is merely a form of life which determines and 
harmonizes the good, rather it is the rational order of determinations of the will. the difference can be under-
stood in that the former case holds only that the objective, institutional order coupled with the subjective 
knowledge of these determinations constrain the actions of the subject within the bounds of intelligibility 
given whichever form of life; or just because humans happen to exist in communities. Hegel holds, on the 
contrary, that objective freedom satisfies the requirements of the subjective will through supplying rational 
determinations and not just determinations.
     31. one immediate Hegelian response would be to invoke an objective, absolutist account of the end of 
history: man inhabits the purely rational state where social and individual good harmonize and do so due 
to the rationality of the institutions which exist. objective freedom meets the requirements of subjective 
freedom and no conflicts between the two can possibly arise. However, it would be necessary to offer a 
thorough description of the nature of the end of history, to acknowledge that Hegel’s intuitions concerning 
certain moral problems and our own differ markedly, to admit that it is in no way obvious that modern 
institutions could deal with future moral problems and, given all these, to reconsider the end of history as 
purely an objective state of affairs. all of this is well beyond the remit of this paper.
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servative strains and themes in his work; he lists, interrogates and attempts to actualize 
the social institutions which existed in the prussian state and, at each step of the argu-
ment, the subjective right—the ‘highest’ right—of individuals appears to play second 
fiddle to the role demanded by the institution itself. 
Hegel’s strongest critic would intimate that the moral conscience described in Mo-
ralität is negated in Sittlichkeit because the right of objectivity determines that deviations 
from the normal and expected behaviour of citizen, worker and family member are 
impossible since these roles exhaust the identity of the individual. the duties of the 
agent in ethical life are to fulfil his or her roles adequately and freedom consists solely in 
actions which are in accordance with one’s duties, that is one’s ‘substantial identity’. in 
this way, one can be recognized by one’s peers and hence be free. yet, this is seemingly 
at the expense of the ‘highest’ right of subjectivity which, if enacted in opposition to the 
ethical norm, can be nothing but mere wilfulness.32
However, if one is to take seriously the role of the moral theory of action which pre-
cedes the account of ethical life, then it is clear that subjectivity still has a role to play in 
the objective freedom of Sittlichkeit. first, if it were true that freedom consisted solely in 
the fulfilment of one’s role within a state that is rational, then there would be no marked 
difference between ancient greek society and our own (lpH 104-7, 444-5). the concept 
of ‘homeliness’ derived from the right of intention (α + β) requires that not only do i 
act on correct and harmonious determinations of the will, but that i also endorse them 
as my own. one cannot be coerced into acting freely, for Hegel. second, within com-
munities that are not fully rational or not even partially so, the subject cannot be free 
except by resisting the norms and expectations placed on him or her: ‘When the exist-
ing world of freedom has become unfaithful to the better will, this will no longer finds 
itself in the duties recognized in this world and must seek to recover in ideal inwardness 
alone that harmony which it has lost in actuality’ (pr § 138 r). the right of intention 
must be effective on the objective order of things and is so through the necessity that 
the actualization of social ideality requires self-conscious knowledge: the free, rational 
state is not one in which the institution of slavery could exist; its rationality cannot be 
actualized as all persons are to be considered equals in the free, rational state (pr §§ 36, 
155). thus, the right of objectivity requires a subjective will capable of endorsing it; that 
is, finding it rational for itself. 
When a child wears a seat-belt he does so to safeguard his personhood, but such a 
reason is rational only in itself. the child actually acts on another reason: to avoid be-
ing shouted at by his mother (personhood). as the child grows, however, he comes to 
realize that the reason for wearing a seatbelt is to protect himself; that is, he recognizes 
the good as his own and so he is ‘at home’ with his social motivation. He is aware that, 
not only is he reasonable to his mother and her expectations, but also to himself: this is 
an act which is rational for him not just his mother. He now has self-knowledge of the 
reason and it is both in itself rational and also for him rational. only when objective 
freedom makes possible the satisfaction of desires which can be freely chosen, known 
     32. tugendhat, Self-consciousness and Self-determination.
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and transparent, is the agent fully responsible. thus, for fully free, responsible action, 
the right of knowledge is required and individuals stand in a relationship to their sub-
stantial identity but remain distinct from it (pr § 148).
therefore, the right of intention crucial to free action can be inflated into a form of 
rational legitimation. the rational system of the will’s self-determination, for modern 
man, is self-conscious knowledge of the underlying necessity implicit in the customs 
and mores of Sittlichkeit. to be ‘at home’ (as required by the right on intention) involves 
knowing not only what one does but that it is a good for oneself. it is ‘customary’ to 
wear a seatbelt, and one wears it without much ‘selective reflection,’ but, it is possible 
to actualize the custom; that is, to make apparent its rationality to the knowing subject. 
the strong critic of Hegel’s social philosophy mistakes ‘trust’ in one’s objective order 
for blind faith. this difference is best illustrated by Hegel’s own distinction between 
reflective (the state) and unreflective trust (the family) and the possibility to articulate 
one’s reasons for action. if i am to save my child from drowning or, on a lesser scale, to 
provide for the material needs of my family, i cannot truly articulate the reason why 
i fulfil this role. the best i can manage is ‘because they are my children.’ moreover, 
someone who demands that i justify my reasons for these actions is simply inhuman, 
not in the sense of evil, but in the sense that they cannot truly comprehend what it is 
to be a human being. these reasons, then, are immediate and unreflective and trust in 
one’s family members is based on the same disposition.33 the reflective trust in the state 
is open to scrutiny, though; this is the formal requirement of subjective, moral freedom. 
it is perfectly sensible to demand a justification of a particular law, social duty or more 
and why i should act in accordance with it. However, agents rarely demand justifica-
tion and as such express a reflective trust in their state; its laws and institutions are open 
to legitimation and the state must make scrutiny by the citizen possible, but this need 
not be carried through every time a demand on the citizen is made. a useful analogy 
is differentiation in mathematics. all of us are quite happy to use the formula ‘nxn-1’, but 
in order for us to be certain it must be possible for us to carry out the calculation from 
first-principles. the laws of the state are a type of shorthand of the good, but which 
must remain possible objects of legitimation even when not perpetually legitimated. 
the subject has ‘trust’ in the objective social order and its rationality (epm § 525; pr, 
§ 147). the ‘trust’ of the ancient greeks was inarticulate and, hence, it was mere social 
luck that they lived in a rational state. modern ethical life makes possible the satisfac-
tion of subjective freedom, rather than—as many commentators hostile to the Hegelian 
picture suppose—determining the content of subjective freedom. it is no longer a matter 
of ‘luck’ that we live in a rational state since without the subjective endorsement of the 
morally free agent, the duties of Sittlichkeit are not actual duties (pr § 138 r). 
the proper consideration of the right of intention seems to put pay to the strong 
criticism of Hegel’s social philosophy, but this idea is rarely the motivation behind the 
apologist approach of many of his supporters. a more subtle challenge to the relation-
     33. this is perhaps why the abuse of children by their parents is such a reprehensible crime, there is a 
certain element of inhumanity in it which horrifies us.
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ship between the moral conscience and the state would propose that, if reason giving is 
inherently social as Hegel holds, then surely the tendency will be—in cases of conflict 
between individual good and social good—to side with the familiar and conventional. 
With the stronger form of the challenge, social protest is impossible and irrational, but 
this is to negate absolutely the ‘highest right’ of the subject. the weaker form of the 
challenge does not fully negate the right of knowledge: one is able to deny the deter-
minations of one’s role when one cannot endorse its rationality. However, given that 
this endorsement is a social practice, protest stemming from the moral conscience is 
ultimately mute since the right of objectivity, that my actions be rational for others, 
implicitly commits Hegel to conservatism. endorsement amounts to nothing more than 
yes-saying: the subject reflects upon his duties and recognizes that they accord with ob-
jective determinations. the strong challenge pictured Hegel rather unconvincingly as 
a strong communitarian who believed agents are identical with (rather than identified 
with) their roles. the weaker challenge is more persuasive, Hegel appears committed to 
conservatism which means subjective freedom may be compromised by social pressure 
because the social nature of reason-giving means the conventional is always by default 
more persuasive than personal conviction.
the first point to make is simply to admit Hegel is a conservative, that much is clear 
both from his continued critique of the use of abstract right in political theorizing and in 
his tinkering with—rather than overhaul of—the prussian state. However, conservatism 
may be compatible with central liberal values and does not necessarily commit Hegel to 
quietism in the face of one’s duties in the state. furthermore, the reasons for his conser-
vatism, especially in the aftermath of the french revolution, are perhaps justified. 
in order to resist the accusation that Hegel’s form of rational legitimation is noth-
ing but yes-saying to authority, it would be worthwhile to return to the example of the 
mother who finds herself unable to fulfil her role without stealing and violating the 
system of private property. let us assume that Hegel would see this as an instance of 
the ‘better will’ in an ‘unfaithful world’ (pr § 138 r). on an idealized liberal model, 
the standards of positive right would be legitimated by an appeal to external values or 
natural rights. so, the right to life would trump political obligation since civil obedience 
rests on a duty to comply with political dictates as long as they protect and secure external 
rights and values. if they no longer do so, then the citizen’s obligation is null and void. 
However, for Hegel, there are no external standards of right independent of the social 
and historical development of ethical life.34 it seems the weaker challenge has some bite: 
protest when contrary to customary morality is mere wilfulness.
the example of the impoverished mother, though, undermines such an idle read-
ing. the proper understanding of Hegel’s theory of action demonstrates that the role of 
objective freedom and its earlier, abstract cousin—the right of objectivity—is to enable 
personal self-determination and not to thwart it. liberation from immediate needs, 
independence from irrational authorities, the possibility to be self-willed and certain 
recognition by others are all requirements of self-determination and if they do not ob-
     34. rose, Hegel’s Philosophy of  Right, pp. 16-29.
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tain, then the subject is not free. the mother is recognized as in the right when she 
steals because the life of her child ought to be secured and maintained by the objective 
structures, arrangements and practices of her social existence. otherwise the world is 
unfaithful to her better will. the state, for the mother, is irrational because she cannot 
satisfy her roles as both mother and citizen as she would freely choose to do. she has 
the subjective right—the highest right—to demand that the state make possible rational 
self-determination. and protest need not be limited to cases of disharmony between the 
spheres of ethical life. Historical examples of the need to reject the objective features of 
a state would include slavery and apartheid since fulfilling one’s civil role inhibits one’s 
personal freedom.35 such institutions make it impossible for certain agents to fulfil them-
selves as human beings since other agents cannot recognize what they truly are: they 
remain identical with their role and, hence, not free.
5 conclusion
for man to be free—that is, to be at home with himself—the content of his will must 
be his own. for the existing social world to be actualized, then the underlying rationality 
of its dictates and obligations has to be known and endorsed by the thinking subject, but 
such an endorsement cannot be mere yes-saying. freedom is formal when i am able to 
satisfy my desires (personal freedom), but it is substantial when i satisfy desires which 
are my good. yet, this does not rule out coercion for my benefit (the child). the will is 
free when it is substantial, able to be satisfied and moral. Without moral freedom, the 
will of man is no better than the slave or the child or as Hegel tells us, the ‘ethical [sit-
tliche] will’; that is the ethical will which is not actual because the agent is unaware of its 
rationality (ancient greece) (pr § 26). the purely subjective will is arbitrary, whereas 
the purely objective will depends on ‘luck’ to have ethical content.
the two central concepts of the third section of the Philosophy of  Right—that is, 
subjective and objective freedom—originate from the rights of knowledge, intention 
and objectivity of action which characterize the abstract moral will. objective freedom 
is necessary for and supplements—which, is to say, ethical life actualizes—personal and 
moral freedom. Without the categories of ethical life, it would be impossible to form 
judgements concerning the intentions of others. thus, ethical life is the substantial form 
of the right of objectivity of an action. reciprocally, subjective freedom interrogates 
and justifies objective freedom. if the subject cannot, or is obstructed from, satisfying 
his rational desires, then he is not free and responsible. He, then, has a legitimate claim 
     35. critically, Hegel’s own descriptions of the role of women in the family, the rigidity of social class and 
the postulation of a hereditary monarch possibly contradict the requirements of equality and careers open 
to talents which he espouses as necessary for the state to be rational. these, of course, are open to inter-
pretation and i only throw them somewhat glibly in here to demonstrate that, though Hegel’s conservatism 
does not rule out social criticism stemming from the moral conscience, he is often—i believe—guilty of 
lazy conservatism in describing elements of institutions which are not rational on his own account. such 
a discussion is, however, beyond the scope of this paper, but these do illustrate possible areas in which the 
moral conscience has a proper claim against the duties of the state.
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against the state arising from his own moral conscience. so long as the claim is unre-
solved, freedom is unobtainable and the institutions of ethical life are no longer rational. 
it is this right of knowledge which constitutes the role of the moral will in Sittlichkeit. 
morality remains an essential element of modern Sittlichkeit since, to actualize the ra-
tionality of existing social structures, this rationality has to be self-consciously known. 
otherwise we are merely ‘lucky’ citizens like the ancient greeks and children with good 
and rational parents.
dr david rose 
newcastle university 
d.e.rose@ncl.ac.uk
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